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Theory means recognizing the universal in the particular, in the concrete. 
(Coseriu 2000, 111)
1. Introduction
In this article, I explore two questions that are important to “categorial par-
ticularism” in the study of languages. “Categorial particularism” refers to the 
view that each language should be described “in its own terms” rather than 
“in terms of a set of preestablished categories that are assumed to be universal” 
ABSTRACT
Studies in linguistic typology have challenged the idea that languages can be 
analyzed in terms of a set of preestablished universal categories. Each language 
should instead be described “in its own terms,” a view consistent with the ‘old’ 
structuralist paradigm in linguistics. The renewed orientation toward differences 
between languages raises two questions: (i) How do we identify the meanings 
which are assumed to be crosslinguistically comparable? (ii) What is the relationship 
between language-particular categories and comparative concepts commonly 
used in linguistic typology? To answer these questions, this article focuses on 
a number of distinctions advocated by Eugenio Coseriu (1921–2002). Coseriu 
distinguishes three levels of meaning (designation, “signifiés,” and sense) and three 
types of universals (essential, empirical, and possible universals). Their relevance 
for linguistic typology is discussed with regard to the expression of possession 
and a particular diathesis in Japanese, viz. ukemi or “indirect passive.” As well as 
relating language-particular categories and comparative concepts, Coseriu’s 
approach offers a promising avenue to account for the ways language-specific 
meanings interact with extralinguistic knowledge and contents of discourse and 
texts, which are the object of translation.
CONTACT Klaas Willems  Klaas.Willems@ugent.be
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2  K. WillEmS
(Haspelmath 2010, 664). I will consider the following two questions related to 
this position:
(1)  How do we identify the meanings that are assumed to be crosslin-
guistically commensurable and with which we find ourselves in the 
realm of general “substance” rather than language-specific meanings?
(2)  What is the relationship between language-particular categories and 
comparative, so-called crosslinguistic concepts that are commonly 
used in linguistic typology?
The article is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the main arguments 
put forward in current functional typology in support of the view that cross-
linguistic comparison is based in semantics and that linguistic categories are 
language-particular. In Section 3, I present some ideas advanced by Eugenio 
Coseriu (1921–2002) that are useful to clarify the issues at hand. I focus on two 
series of distinctions found in several of his writings (e.g. Coseriu [1955] 1975, 
1977, 1985, 1987, 1992, [1972] 2004, 2007) in order to differentiate between 
three levels of meaning and three types of universals. I proceed with discuss-
ing two examples – the expression of possession (Section 4) and the ukemi 
construction in Japanese (Section 5) – against the backdrop of the claim that 
crosslinguistic comparison is possible because people “can understand each 
other across linguistic boundaries” (Haspelmath 2007, 119, 126–127) and that 
language-particular categories and crosslinguistic concepts are independent 
of one another (Dryer 1997; Haspelmath 2007, 2010). Section 6 concludes the 
article.
2. Background
With studies such as Dryer (1997), Croft (2003), Haspelmath (2007, 2010, 
2012), Evans and Levinson (2009), a number of differences and similarities 
between the structuralist paradigm, which dominated much of twentieth-cen-
tury linguistics, and current functional approaches in linguistic typology have 
gained renewed attention in the theory of linguistics. One of the central top-
ics in the debate is the status of language-particular categories (occasionally 
written with a capital letter) and crosslinguistic concepts (written with lower 
case to indicate their role as comparative labels; Haspelmath 2010, 674). The 
universal validity of language-particular categories is called into question. 
Crosslinguistic concepts are said to be useful as universally applicable terms 
for conventional purposes only. As a consequence, discussions about assign-
ments of some language-specific phenomenon to a crosslinguistic concept are 
much less important than has long been assumed. For example, Dryer (1997, 
124–128) convincingly argues that detailed descriptions of grammatical rela-
tions in Dyirbal are not dependent on the allegedly “universal,” broadly defined 
concepts ‘subject’ and ‘object.’ As long as the language-specific descriptions 
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ACTA linguiSTiCA HAfniEnSiA  3
are accurate (cf. Dixon 1972, 1994), the question whether the grammatical 
relations in Dyirbal should be called ‘subject’ and ‘object,’ or whether the con-
stituent in the absolutive is the ‘subject’ of the sentence, are not of a substantive 
but merely a terminological nature (Dryer 1997, 125; cf. Dryer 2006). The 
relevance of such questions is limited to providing conventional labels – most 
often inherited from the Greco-Latin grammatical tradition – for the isomor-
phism between grammatical categories and relations in different languages, e.g. 
between Dyirbal and a language such as English which possesses ‘subject’ and 
‘object’ as language-particular categories (Dryer 1997, 133).
The particularist position contrasts with the universalist position of most 
generative linguists, who claim that Universal Grammar encompasses a set 
of innate categories, structures, and rules. They assume that all languages are 
to some extent identical; the diversity found across languages is reduced to a 
set of preestablished categories, structures, and rules. Conversely, categorial 
particularists consider language diversity to be the touchstone of the language 
sciences. What needs explanation is not diversity, which is acknowledged from 
the outset, but rather the observation that despite the diversity there is also 
isomorphism between languages. Rather than making languages similar in 
linguistic analysis, the goal is to observe to what extent fundamentally different 
languages are in fact similar (cf. Coseriu 1977, 333).
It would seem that the conclusion that each language has its own lan-
guage-particular “categories” is unavoidable and true to the basic observation of 
language diversity. It has been pointed out that categorial particularism contin-
ues a line of research present in structuralist linguistics, in particular the earliest 
tradition inaugurated by Boas (1911) (Haspelmath 2007, 2010). The view that 
each language should be described in its own terms furthermore dovetails with 
the Saussurean standpoint that every “langue” is a unique system of linguistic 
signs which Saussure ([1916] 1968) defined as language-specific pairings of 
“signifiants” (forms) and “signifiés” (meanings). To Saussure, a “signifié” exists 
by virtue of being historically associated with a “signifiant,” i.e. the linguistic 
sign is an indissoluble historical unit, the two sides of which can only be sepa-
rated by a posterior act of analysis (Willems 2005). Accordingly, a distinction 
has to be made between the language-specific “signifié” of a linguistic sign and 
its use in discourse (“parole”). For instance, the Sanskrit plural and the Latin 
plural are similar but not identical because in Latin the plural contrasts with 
the singular, whereas in Sanskrit the plural contrasts with the singular and the 
dual. Hence, the Sanskrit and the Latin plural may both be used to designate 
the same state of affairs, but this is achieved on the basis of different under-
lying contrasts in the systems of grammatical “signifiés” of the two languages 
(Saussure [1916] 1968, 262).
Meaning (or “substance”) is obviously of particular importance in the 
discussion of how the language-specific and the universal level of languages 
are related. Functional typologists explicitly address the role of meaning as a 
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4  K. WillEmS
tertium comparationis in crosslinguistic research (Comrie 1989; Dryer 1997; 
Croft 2003; Haspelmath 2007; Evans and Levinson 2009 etc.). However, “mean-
ing” is not a self-explanatory concept, nor is it clear how to compare meanings 
across languages. On the one hand, Haspelmath writes:
[…] experience shows that people can understand each other across linguistic 
boundaries with some efforts. Translation is generally possible, even if not always 
straightforward. Notice that for the purposes of typological comparison we do 
not need identity of strictly linguistic meanings. All we need is some level of 
meaning at which meanings must be commensurable. Thus, it is not necessary 
for both Polish and Igbo to have the same semantic category of “possession” in 
order to be able to compare possessive constructions in these two languages. All 
we need is the possibility to translate low-level notions like ‘my father’s house’ 
into both languages. We can define the semantic relation between ‘I’ and ‘father’, 
and between ‘father’ and ‘house’ as “possessive”. It seems that in almost all lan-
guages that have been described so far, the grammatical form of the equivalent 
of my father’s house is used for a broader range of relations (e.g. also for ‘my 
mother’s bike’, ‘my sister’s husband’, ‘my husband’s hair’, ‘my daughter’s teacher’, 
or even ‘my life’s purpose’, ‘the planet’s orbit’, ‘the guest’s seat’, etc.). Languages 
differ considerably in this regard, making comparison more complex, but as long 
as there is translatability of simple concepts, comparison should be possible. 
(Haspelmath 2007, 128)
On the other hand, Comrie (1989, 53) rejects the view that translatability pro-
vides “any close correlation with the existence of language universals.” According 
to Comrie, the evaluation of translations “requires reference to extralinguistic 
knowledge and is largely independent of the structural properties of languages” 
(Comrie 1989, 60; cf. Comrie 1998). Given that there is no settled opinion on 
the issue at present, I argue in the next section that a number of conceptual 
distinctions are called for in order to turn the focus on language-particular 
categories and the “commensurable” level of meaning into a methodologically 
viable approach of the differences and similarities between languages. To this 
end, I draw on the work of Eugenio Coseriu.
3. Coseriu’s layered model of linguistic competence
It is interesting to compare categorial particularism with the views on mean-
ing and categories advocated by Coseriu in many of his writings, which 
often appeared in different versions, languages, and translations. Coseriu 
is widely recognized as one of the major last representatives of a submerged 
tradition informed by European and American structuralism (Willems 
2003). Coseriu, to his credit, raises the shortcomings of this tradition but 
his professed goal is to overcome them while at the same time building on 
its achievements. Accordingly, he pays much more attention to variation, 
diachrony, functional explanations, and the philosophical underpinning of 
linguistics than classical structuralists. He subscribes on the one hand to 
the principle that “each language must be described from its own point of 
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ACTA linguiSTiCA HAfniEnSiA  5
view” but claims on the other that one should not be led to “exaggerate the 
differences between languages while ignoring structural analogies both in 
function and in form” (Coseriu 1977, 317). So it seems that we find here 
a variant of the traditional view of “unity in diversity,” i.e. that part of lin-
guistic research is “simultaneously about the diversity and uniformity” of 
the universe of human languages (Seiler 1995, 299; cf. Plank 1997, 1; Croft 
2003, 53, 86; Moravcsik 2007, 29).
An important part of Coseriu’s views can be summarized in a grid (Table 
1). The grid outlines a theoretical framework designed to conduct a com-
prehensive analysis of linguistic competence, broadly construed. Coseriu 
proffers a distinction between complementary perspectives on language, 
which he borrows from Aristotle and Humboldt, and levels of generality 
of language, ranging from the level of speaking understood as a univer-
sal activity over the so-called “idiomatic” level of particular languages to 
the individual level of utterances. Combining three perspectives with the 
orthogonal distinction between three levels of language gives rise to Table 
1 (from Coseriu 1985, xxix and 2007, 75).
It is not possible to deal with all issues covered in this grid in the scope 
of this article. I will restrict myself to two aspects relating to the two main 
research questions and which figure prominently in the above table: the three 
kinds of knowledge, which in Coseriu’s view account for different aspects of 
“meaning,” and the universal level of “speaking in general” and its relationship 
with linguistic categories and concepts.
On the one hand, Coseriu (1977) is in full agreement with the position of 
categorial particularism that linguistic signs and structures are language-spe-
cific, in particular as far as their semantics is concerned. In this sense, Coseriu 
too continues the legacy of structuralism with its emphasis on the differences 
among individual “langues.” Coseriu even goes so far as to maintain that each 
language should be regarded as constituting its own “type,” i.e. as potentially 
having a unique structural “character” in the sense Humboldt accorded to 
this term (Coseriu 1972, 1983, 2002; compare Lehmann 1988 and Aschenberg 
2001 for discussion). This may well be among the most radical conclusions 
one can draw from a particularist point of view. On the other hand, accord-
ing to Coseriu (1977) linguists have to acknowledge the similarities among 
 languages in a principled way. In order to establish similarities and differences, 
Table 1. coseriu’s layered model of linguistic competence.
levels of language
Points of view
Activity (Energeia) Knowledge (Dynamis) Product (Ergon)
universal speaking in general elocutional knowledge totality of utterances
Historical concrete particular 
language
idiomatic knowledge (Abstracted particular 
language)
individual Discourse expressive knowledge text
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6  K. WillEmS
he distinguishes between the aforementioned levels of meaning. This distinction 
seems particularly useful to clarify the object of typological research addressed 
in the first research question raised in Section 1. In Section 4, I first consider 
the three levels of meaning with regard to the concept of possession as a case 
in point. In Section 5, I turn to Coseriu’s additional distinction between three 
types of universals.
4. Three levels of meaning: the expression of possession in 
language
As was pointed out above, it has been assumed that basic concepts such as 
possession can be compared across languages because the concept of posses-
sion is identifiable at the crosslinguistic level at which translation is possible 
(Haspelmath 2007, 128). By contrast, Comrie (1989) maintains that the exist-
ence of language universals does not hinge on translatability. From a Coserian 
perspective, there are three different kinds of semantic knowledge (the German 
term is “Erkenntnis”): designation (elocutional knowledge), meaning or “sig-
nifié” (idiomatic knowledge) and sense (expressive knowledge) (Coseriu 1977, 
337–344, 1985, xxx–xxxiv). The translatability Haspelmath (2007) is referring 
to bears on the elocutional and the expressive levels, not the idiomatic level. 
However, we will see that languages are also commensurable at the level of 
idiomatic knowledge, albeit in a different sense.1 With regard to the latter level, 
Comrie (1989, 60) is right to point out that language universals are “independ-
ent of questions of translatability.” I now consider the three levels in more detail.
Expressive knowledge involves the sense of utterances and texts, it is the level 
on which the conveying of discursive contents is to be situated. This level is 
crucial to translation because the object of translations are not languages and 
their categories but specific texts and sentences expressed in a source language 
that are to be transferred into another language (cf. Coseriu 1978 for extensive 
discussion). Coseriu illustrates this level with the translation of stock expressions 
and phrases. For example, the expressive knowledge which is conveyed when 
using It. Mi dispiace cannot normally be rendered by I dislike it in English or Es 
missfällt mir in German. One has to say I am sorry and Entschuldigung or Ich 
entschuldige mich or something in that vein (Coseriu 1985, xxxiv). This shows 
that language-specific meanings (idiomatic knowledge) are not the object but 
the instruments of translation, they are used to express a similar or functionally 
comparable message in another language. This not only means that translata-
bility is not, as is often thought, about the possibility of translating “languages” 
(although difficulties in translation may arise from, e.g. metalinguistic features of 
1“idiomatic” should not be confused with “idiom” in its more standard usage of a formally and semantically 
fixed expression. in coseriu’s model, the “idiomatic level” encompasses everything related to the structural, 
grammatical, and semantic character of a specific language, which also includes knowledge of diachronic 
phenomena, dialect variation, and register variation (coseriu 2007, 133).
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ACTA linguiSTiCA HAfniEnSiA  7
expressions such as puns), but also that one may have to give up the immediately 
equivalent reference of an expression in favor of an adequate discursive content 
(compare dispiacere and entschuldigen in the above example). Another example 
of Coseriu’s is when people greet each other in the morning. On that particular 
occasion, Good morning and Bonjour have the same expressive function, although 
morning and jour (`day’) differ in meaning. These few examples suffice to show 
that expressive knowledge is a potentially universal semantic layer, yet it does not 
pertain to the encoded meanings of the languages themselves but to what people 
convey by using language in discourse. Expressive knowledge is therefore among 
the semantic levels at which crosslinguistic comparison is possible, yet it is not the 
level at which language-specific meanings are commensurable. This squares with 
the well-known structuralist thesis that, in Roman Jakobson’s (1959, 234–236) 
famous words, “all cognitive experience and its classification is conveyable in any 
existing language” and that languages “differ essentially in what they must convey 
and not in what they may convey” (cf. also Seiler 1995, 316–320).
Elocutional knowledge comprises the general, extralinguistic, and hence 
non-language-specific knowledge of the world, including “logical” principles 
of thought (Coseriu [1955] 1975, 280–284, 2007, 89–132). This is the level at 
which we know, e.g. that He boiled the piano is in some way deviant (Coseriu 
1985, xxx), not because of some language-specific constraint but because the 
thought expressed in the sentence does not conform to what we know about 
pianos and boiling, no matter in what language it is expressed (and perhaps 
with sufficient context it could be made acceptable). Elocutional knowledge 
is furthermore related to the aforementioned level of expressive knowledge, 
as discourse is normally about what happens “in the world” as we know it, 
including the world of thoughts, fantasy, and emotions.
The concept of “possession” would count, first of all, as an elocutional 
concept in Coseriu’s classificatory system. It may be assumed that all speakers 
can conceptualize the relationship of possession (Seiler 1995, 276). However, 
the way this relationship is, in Seiler’s terminology, “linguistically encoded,” 
differs across languages, to the extent that it may not be coded at all (cf. 
Nichols and Bickel 2013). From a Coserian perspective, this entails that there 
are two steps to consider in the analysis. The first step consists in determin-
ing whether the concept is formally coded. If so, then in a second step the 
idiomatic knowledge that corresponds to the concept has to be identified. I 
consider these steps in turn.
It first has to be established whether the elocutional concept of possession 
is formally coded (in particular lexically or grammatically). If this is not the 
case, then the concept is designated – or “referred at” – without being properly 
“signified” by means of formal coding. To use a term of Levinson’s (2000, 25) 
“three-leveled theory” of meaning, which happens to have many similarities with 
Coseriu’s model of semantic knowledge: if there is no formal coding,  possession 
is not a lexical or grammatical category but either a plausible inference or, more 
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [G
he
nt 
Un
ive
rsi
ty]
, [
Kl
aa
s W
ill
em
s] 
at 
00
:56
 13
 Ju
ly 
20
16
 
8  K. WillEmS
likely, a default reading, i.e. a Generalized Conversational Implicature (GCI). 
From a Coserian perspective, it is necessary to keep these possibilities apart when 
we apply the term “universal.” If possession is considered a universal, then it is 
universal in an altogether different sense according to whether the concept is 
coded or left to inference, even if the inference is highly conventionalized as is the 
case with GCIs. Only in the latter case is the concept conversationally defeasible, 
whereas it is not if it is coded, because then it is expressed whenever the corre-
sponding form is realized. In Coseriu’s terminology, this means that in different 
languages there may be differences in idiomatic knowledge corresponding to 
the universal elocutional concept of possession. For example, Newmeyer (1998, 
347) remarks that, in English, “possession” is not the language-specific meaning 
of either the genitive construction or the of-construction because neither con-
struction is confined to this particular function, compare:
(1) a. The table’s leg – the leg of the table
b. Tuesday’s lecture, Rome’s destruction – a piece of cake, the de-
struction of Rome
Yet with the appropriate lexical material, e.g. table and leg, both constructions 
can be used to designate possession. This entails that with either construction the 
possessive relationship has to be inferred in English, and it is arguably a GCI with 
combinations such as (1a). Nevertheless, because the constructions do not them-
selves encode (“signify” as idiomatic knowledge) the possessive relationship, this 
relationship remains an elocutional concept in (1a). Moreover, to the extent that it 
is designated through the more general language-specific meanings of the genitive 
construction and the of-construction, the elocutional concept is part of the expres-
sive knowledge of the discourses in which noun phrases such as the table’s leg and 
the leg of the table occur. The conclusion that universal elocutional knowledge can 
be conveyed without being coded in the linguistic construction, also holds for an 
utterance such as (2) in French. It encodes ‘he raised the arm’ but it is normally used 
to designate ‘he raised his arm’ (Seiler 1995, 281; cf. McCawley 1978):
(2) Il a levé le bras
I now turn to the second step of the analysis which involves the level of idiomatic 
knowledge at which a concept such as possession is formally coded. The coding can 
differ in degree of specificity. For example, in German the use of the verb gehören 
without a preposition and with a dative object is limited to express a particular kind 
of possession, viz. a relationship of ownership, hence alienable possession (Coseriu 
1977, 343). You can say (3a), but not normally (3b–c):
(3) a. Das Haus gehört dem Lehrer (‘The teacher possesses the house’)
b. *Die Hände gehören dem Körper
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ACTA linguiSTiCA HAfniEnSiA  9
c. *Die Finger gehören der Hand
If you want to use gehören in contexts (3b–c), you have to add the prepo-
sition zu, or else you should choose a general verb such as haben: Die Hände 
gehören zum Körper (‘The body has hands’), Die Hand hat Finger (‘The hand has 
fingers’). By contrast, in French the verb appartenir is not subject to such a con-
straint, its general language-specific meaning ‘possession by (inter)dependence’ 
leaves underspecified the alienable/inalienable distinction. As a consequence, 
appartenir can be used to designate all of the aforementioned relationships:
(4) a. La maison appartient au professeur
b. Les mains appartiennent au corps
c. Les doigts appartiennent à la main d’un homme
Thus, languages may code possession in a general sense, code one or more 
particular subtypes of possession, or possibly a combination of both. Before 
jumping to conclusions about the universal status of the concept, we therefore 
need to determine whether we intend to say something about the concept as 
it is idiomatically coded or elocutionally inferred.
The distinction between alienable and inalienable possession is a very com-
mon one in anthropological research and it has received a lot of attention in 
typology as well. One of the findings reported by Seiler (1995) and Bickel and 
Nichols (2013) is that there are many languages, in particular in the Americas, 
in which alienable and inalienable possession are coded differently, and body-
part nouns figure consistently among the possessed nouns which are either 
obligatorily or optionally inflected for possession. Furthermore, if a language 
possesses a subclass of non-possessible nouns, this subclass almost always 
includes names of animals (Bickel and Nichols 2013). So although there are 
considerable crosslinguistic differences, there also emerge certain similarities, 
in particular with regard to the designation of body parts, which obviously are 
not purely coincidental. Such similarities are particularly interesting to typo-
logical research (cf. Shibatani 1994). They point to general tendencies at the 
idiomatic levels of encoded concepts with respect to specific areas of human 
experience in different languages. A straightforward language-external expla-
nation is that reference to body parts is so fundamental to human beings that 
it is not surprising that languages tend to code the possession of inalienable 
body parts at least partly differently from alienable things or properties (cf. 
Dryer 1997, 134). But even if such an external motivation is granted, it remains 
necessary to determine for each language whether this subtype of possession, 
just like the subtype ownership and possibly more, is coded differently at the 
language-specific idiomatic level compared to other possessive relationships.
Interestingly, similar strong crosslinguistic tendencies at the idiomatic level 
can be observed if we look at the combination of nouns referring to alienable 
and inalienable relationships (e.g. ‘house,’ ‘hair,’ ‘father’) with verbs that differ 
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10  K. WillEmS
in the more or less specific way they code possessive relationships. Seiler (1995, 
292) adduces the following table which shows the scalar ordering of distri-
butional constraints with haben, besitzen, and gehören in German (Table 2).2
Of course, it remains to be seen how general such distributional constraints 
are across languages.
In conclusion to this section, we observe that elocutional knowledge (desig-
nation and general principles of thought) and expressive knowledge (discursive 
contents) are the two levels where similarities of concepts across utterances in dif-
ferent languages are most easily found. In Table 1, the term “universal” is used to 
refer to elocutional knowledge primarily because it is the knowledge that consti-
tutes a general ontological stratum of languages understood as cultural artifacts of 
human beings. Expressive knowledge, too, can lay claim to universality insofar as 
the contents conveyed in discourse and texts are to a large extent not language-spe-
cific. Hence, being the levels that are first and foremost involved in translation, 
elocutional and expressive knowledge are the prime candidates for crosslinguistic 
comparison in the sense intended by Haspelmath (2007, 128). Yet the idiomatic 
level of language-specific meanings also appears to be amenable to crosslinguistic 
analysis in which there is room for universal tendencies. This raises the question 
how similarities at the idiomatic level can be accommodated in the analysis and 
how crosslinguistic concepts relate to language-particular categories, with regard 
to both the lexicon and syntax (cf. Haspelmath 2007, 2010 and Newmeyer 2010). 
I consider this question in more detail in the next section.
5. Language-particular categories and comparative concepts
5.1 Three types of universals
To account for universals at the language-specific level of idiomatic knowl-
edge, Coseriu introduces a distinction which crosscuts the three-leveled dif-
ferentiation between kinds of knowledge discussed above. Coseriu assumes 
that there are three main types of universals. He is not entirely explicit about 
2the constraints seiler assumes for Vater appear to be too strong. Although a sentence such as X hat 
einen Sohn is more likely to occur than X hat einen Vater for reasons related to elocutional knowl-
edge, the latter does not violate any conditions imposed by the verb’s valency; compare examples 
such as “Elisa sagt, jeder hat einen Vater” and Damit ist der erste Wunsch von Tochter Susan schon 
erfüllt: Sie hat einen Vater (examples extracted from the german Referenzkorpus, Mannheim; 
http://www1.ids-mannheim.de/kl/projekte/korpora/).
Table 2.  implicational restrictions in the combinations of verbs and nouns designating 
“possession” (seiler 1995).
Vater Sohn Kopf Haar intelligenz Hose Haus
haben – + + + + + +
besitzen – – ? + + + +
gehören – – – – – + +
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ACTA linguiSTiCA HAfniEnSiA  11
the sources of this distinction, but it is clear that he draws on a wide range 
of publications by other scholars, including W. von Humboldt, G. von der 
Gabelentz, and E. Sapir, as well as several chapters in Universals of Language 
(1963) edited by J. Greenberg. Coseriu first considers the well-known distinc-
tion between properties of language that are “universal by definition,” which 
Coseriu calls essential universals, and properties of language that are observed 
in many presently known languages, so-called empirical universals. This dif-
ference figures prominently in Greenberg’s seminal 1963 paper as well. But 
whereas Greenberg and functional typologists nowadays consider universals 
that are definitional of “languagehood” to be tautological and rather uninter-
esting (Evans and Levinson 2009, 436–437), Coseriu insists that they are not 
trivial but worthy of detailed examination. They are founded in a shared “idea 
of language” which according to Coseriu (1977, 325, 344) underlies all activity 
of speaking. Moreover, besides reaffirming the distinction between essential 
and empirical universals, Coseriu stresses the importance of yet another type 
of universal, so-called possible universals.
Given that empirical universals, including implicational universals, are 
familiar notions, I will not further dwell on this type here. We are also familiar 
with essential universals, which according to Coseriu (1977, 319–324) include 
some of Hockett’s “design features” (semanticity, intersubjectivity, historicity, 
creativity, learnability of language, the duality of patterning). However, Coseriu 
also assumes the existence of essential universals that are “categories” and which 
are claimed to be rationally necessary. A number of examples stand out (Coseriu 
1977, 321–322) because they demonstrate the influence of a kind of “thinking 
in contrasts” which is typical of the structuralist tradition.
Although it is not necessary for a language to have personal pronouns as an 
autonomous language-particular category, every language must be “capable of 
distinguishing in some manner the persons of a dialogue from non-persons,” 
according to Coseriu (1977, 321). He does not further substantiate this claim 
and no examples are provided that prove that the contrast he refers to is found 
on the idiomatic levels of all known languages (which it should if it is to count 
as an essential universal in the Coserian framework) and not on the elocutional 
and expressive level (cf. Section 3.2). The two other essential universals high-
lighted by Coseriu are also contrastive pairs rather than single, self-contained 
concepts. One is the long-established contrast between ‘theme’ and ‘rheme’ 
(or ‘topic’ and ‘comment’), understood in functional terms as the distinction 
between positing something and asserting some information about it (Coseriu 
1977, 321; Greenberg 1963, 74). Coseriu insists that this contrast is not identical 
to the one between ‘subject’ and ‘predicate’ which are language-particular cat-
egories whose delimitation requires the establishment of both functional and 
formal, morphosyntactic properties. Recall that if such properties are not found 
in a specific language (e.g. in Dyirbal, Dryer 1997), then the language does not 
possess a Subject (with capital letter), even though it can be useful to use the 
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12  K. WillEmS
term ‘subject’ (with lower case) for reasons of language comparison. Another 
categorial pair considered to be universally valid is ‘substantive function’ and 
‘verbal function’ (Coseriu 1977, 322). This functional pair again refers to seman-
tic functions. As a consequence, “parts of speech” have to be distinguished from 
“word classes” which are lexical classes that normally instantiate parts of speech 
functions. Hence, the verbal function may be designated by, e.g. an adjective.3 
However, it is interesting to notice that there appear to be strong statistical ten-
dencies for major parts of speech functions to be expressed by different classes 
of forms in the lexicon (cf. Coseriu [[, 1972] 2004 for discussion).
I now turn to possible universals. Universality should also be conceived of 
as possibility, according to Coseriu. He writes:
all linguistic categories, even a category observed in a single language, and even 
hypothetical categories which are not in contradiction with the notion of lan-
guage, are universal in the sense that they constitute universal possibilities of 
language – they could occur in other languages which we do not know today or 
they could be adopted for some conceivable linguistic system. (Coseriu 1977, 318)
Possible universals are understood “independent of a given language” (Coseriu 
1977, 319). Of course, Coseriu acknowledges that although any fact of language 
(a category, property, function or formal process) present in one language could 
occur in any other language, there are implicational constraints that determine 
and constrain co-occurrence. This is evident from the kind of implicational 
universals discussed by J. Greenberg and his followers. But these are constraints 
on co-occurring facts of language, no evidence against universal possibility. It 
is therefore not possible to specify an upper limit to the number of possible 
universals in language beforehand. What has to be regarded as potentially uni-
versal in language is only limited by the – itself unbounded – creativity human 
beings display in shaping languages. Language, Coseriu (2000, 109) maintains, 
is an “activity that is free in the philosophical sense of the word – that is, an 
activity whose object is endless, i.e. infinite.” But this is just as well, for the 
notion of possible universal applies to all levels of language, from phonetics 
and phonology over morphology, lexicon, word formation and syntax to parts 
of speech and types of “texts” (Coseriu 1987, 148–152). Obviously, all these 
levels are characterized by general and specific categories, properties, functions 
and formal processes, and the scope of a possible universal varies accordingly.
In the next section, I elaborate on the claim that possible universals are to 
be understood independent of a given language by drawing on Coseriu’s case 
study of a particular diathesis in Japanese (Coseriu [1979] 1987).
3compare Dixon (2004) and the recent discussion triggered by chung (2012) about the alleged universality of 
noun, verb, and adjective; see also croft (2003, 183–188), Haspelmath (2012), and Rijkhoff and van Lier (2013).
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ACTA linguiSTiCA HAfniEnSiA  13
5.2. Diathesis in Japanese revisited: ukemi
Coseriu ([1979] 1987) intends to show that Japanese has an original lan-
guage-particular construction called “ukemi” which is fundamentally differ-
ent from the passive in European languages but at the same time a potentially 
universal diathesis like active, passive, antipassive etc. Coseriu’s account runs 
counter to mainstream – in particular generative, but increasingly also func-
tional – accounts of Japanese grammar which are arguably among the most 
striking examples of “categorial universalism” to be found in post-war linguis-
tics. Kuno (1973), Kuroda (1979), Shibatani (1977, 1985, 1988), Wierzbicka 
(1988), Kinsui (1997), Toyota (2011), Iwasaki (2013), among others, all indis-
criminately apply standard grammatical concepts of the European linguistic 
tradition (‘subject,’ ‘object,’ ‘case,’ ‘(in)transitive verb,’ ‘active,’ ‘passive,’ and so 
on) to the grammar of Japanese. By contrast, Coseriu goes to great lengths to 
argue that Japanese sentences cannot be properly analyzed by transposing such 
concepts from European languages to Japanese.4 He forcefully argues in favor 
of the view that Japanese syntax should be described from a language-specific 
point of view. Coseriu’s account is based on lesser known contrastive studies by 
Shoko Kishitani (mainly published in the 70s and 80s and collected in Kishitani 
1985), but also – without however duly acknowledging this – on the structur-
alist studies by Bloch (1946a, 1946b). I will only give a sketch of the account 
here; readers are referred to Coseriu ([1979] 1987) and Kishitani (1985) for 
more detailed discussions.
The Japanese verb is inflected for tense, aspect, mood, honorific relationships, 
negation etc. but not for person and number. There is no agreement and the ver-
bal constituent can in itself constitute a sentence (see Miller 1975; Kishitani 1985; 
Iwasaki 2013 for examples). According to Kishitani (1985) and Coseriu ([1979] 
1987), Japanese sentences do not have a subject, a direct object or an indirect object 
in the common (i.e. European) understanding of these terms. Whereas in most 
current accounts the noun postpositions (“joshi”) are analyzed as case markers, 
according to Coseriu ([1979] 1987, 103) they are means to encode and organize 
information structure (cf. already Bloch 1946b, 220). The inadequacy of terms such 
as ‘nominative,’ ‘accusative,’ ‘dative’ etc. is evident from the long and diverse lists 
of functions of the most frequent joshi (i.e. ga, o, ni, de, to, no, kara, made, e) pro-
vided by Miller (1975, 38–47), who, by the way, consistently avoids using the term 
“argument” in favor of “adjunct” with regard to Japanese sentences. For example, 
Miller lists more than a dozen functions of ni, only one of which corresponds to 
the prototypical use of the ‘dative’ in ditransitive sentences in European languages 
such as Latin and German. Hence, the current practice of identifying ni as a marker 
of the dative case is highly questionable, even as a comparative label. It amounts to 
4“Japanese” here stands for the standard variety of the language, which requires a certain amount of abstrac-
tion, in particular from social and dialectal variation. see coseriu ([1952] 1975, [1958] 1974, § 2) for an 
extensive discussion of the ontological and analytical status of an “abstract language” in linguistic enquiry. 
cf. also coseriu (2007).
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14  K. WillEmS
assigning a single function to a multifunctional postposition on the basis of a com-
parative perspective under exclusion of any serious language-specific perspective. 
Further evidence supporting the conclusion that ni is not ‘dative,’ o not ‘accusative’ 
and ga not ‘nominative’ comes from the observation that a content such as ‘Taro 
can speak English’ can be rendered in Japanese in various semantically similar 
sentences with, however, different information structures (cf. Iwasaki 2013, 168):
(5) a. Tarō ga eigo o hanas-e-ru
Tarō English speak-potential-nonpast
‘Tarō can speak English’
b. Tarō ga eigo ga hanas-e-ru
c. Tarō ni eigo ga hanas-e-ru
Note that any Japanese verb can be combined with a ga-constituent but 
not with an o- or a ni-constituent (Kishitani 1985, 221). If we also take into 
account the use of the particle wa (commonly classified as a topic marker, yet 
Miller (1975, 52) prefers to characterize its function as “out-focusing” and 
“subduing” as opposed to the “in-focusing” and “highlighting” function of yet 
another thematic particle, mo), then several other alternations can be added 
to (5).5 For these reasons, I prefer not to gloss the noun postpositions in the 
remainder of this section, as ‘nominative,’ ‘dative,’ ‘subject,’ ‘topic’ etc. are bound 
to lead to confusion.
Particularly important for the purpose of the analysis is that Coseriu ([1979] 
1987, 101–102) reiterates the radical particularist claim that all Japanese verbs 
have zero adicity. Bloch was the first to emphasize that “Japanese verbs are 
impersonal; they denote simply the occurrence of an action or the existence 
of a state, usually without reference to any actor” (Bloch 1946a, 98). This is so 
despite the fact that verbs are either “endo-active” (the verb’s event structure 
points to itself) or “exo-active” (the verb’s event structure points to something 
else) by virtue of their lexical semantics (cf. Lewin [1959] 1990, 118–122 and 
Kishitani 1985, 180, 198–199, 217–229 for discussion). This lexical contrast 
can be observed in many verb pairs, mostly with corresponding morphological 
alternation (Iwasaki 2013, 168–170), e.g.:
(6) aku (“endo-active”, ≈ intransitive ‘open’) – akeru (“exo-active”, ≈ tran-
sitive ‘open’)
agaru (≈ ‘rise’) – ageru (≈ ‘raise’)
tatamaru (≈ ‘be folded’) – tatamu (≈ ‘fold’)
nokoru (≈ ‘remain, stay behind’) – nokosu (≈ ‘leave (behind)’)
5compare: Tarō wa eigo ga hanas-eru, Tarō wa eigo wa hanas-eru, Tarō wa eigo o hanas-eru, Tarō ni 
eigo wa hanas-eru, all roughly translatable as ‘tarō can speak english’ as well. By contrast, the following 
sentences are ungrammatical: *Tarō ga eigo ni hanas-eru, *Tarō wa eigo ni hanas-eru, *Tarō ni eigo ni 
hanas-eru, and *Tarō ni eigo o hanas-eru.
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ACTA linguiSTiCA HAfniEnSiA  15
However, this contrast is not reflected as a difference between intransi-
tive and transitive grammatical constructions (Coseriu [1979] 1987, 102). 
Moreover, Japanese is well known for the fact that a lot of information can 
be left unexpressed if it is recoverable from the situation or context (Bloch 
1946a, 98; Miller 1975, 28, 1063; Coseriu [1979] 1987, 102; Bossong 1989, 
36; Iwasaki 2013, 12).
The many differences between Japanese and European languages emerge 
when a strictly language-particular analysis is combined with a subsequent 
comparative analysis. A particularly revealing case in point is ukemi, to 
which I now turn. The lexical distinction between “endo-active” and “exo-ac-
tive” crosscuts the possibility for a verb to occur in the ukemi construction 
(note that ukemi is not possible with all verbs, Kishitani 1985, 226). In 
modern textbooks, it is customary to distinguish two types of “passive” in 
Japanese: the original “indirect passive” (ukemi), which expresses reference 
to an affected person (so-called ji), and the “direct passive” (judō). The 
latter is also called “translational passive” (Miller 1975, 294; Kishitani 1985, 
230) because it is, unlike ukemi, modeled after the passive construction in 
European languages and hence the result of language contact. However, in 
modern Japanese both constructions are fully standard. The differences 
between neutral diathesis, judō and ukemi are illustrated below; the voice 
for both ukemi and judō is -(r)are- (here glossed as PSS for the sake of 
exposition; number differences such as kodomo ‘child/children’ are disre-
garded in the glosses):
(7) a. neutral diathesis
kodomo ga doa o ake-ru
child door open-nonpast
‘A/the child opens the door’
b. neutral diathesis
Tarō ga kodomo ni jitensha o yar-u
Tarō child bicycle give-nonpast
‘Taro gives a bicycle to the child’
c. neutral diathesis, elliptical
doa o ake-ru
door open-nonpast
lit. ‘Opens the door.’ (The agent is recoverable.)
d. judō
doa ga kodomo ni ake-rare-ta
door child open-pss-past
‘The door is/gets opened by a/the child’
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16  K. WillEmS
e. judō, elliptical
doa ga ake-rare-ta
door open-pss-past
‘The door was/got opened.’ (The agent does not need to be  
recoverable.)
f. ukemi
kodomo ni doa o ake-rare-ta
Child door open-pss-past
‘The door was/got opened by a/the child [ji – unexpressed – is 
adversely affected]’
g. ukemi, strongly elliptical
doa o ake-rare-ta
door open-pss-past
‘The door was/got opened [ji is adversely affected, e.g. ji does not 
want the door opened].’ (The agent is recoverable.)
h. ukemi, full construction
Hanako wa/ga kodomo ni doa o ake-rare-ta
Hanako child door open-pss-past
‘Hanako was adversely affected by a/the child’s having opened the 
door.’ (Hanako = ji)
There are important differences in the uses of the postpositions ga/
wa, o, and ni in the three diatheses illustrated in (7) (I do not consider 
other diatheses in Japanese such as causative and benefactive). Whereas 
ga marks the agent and o the patient or theme in the neutral diathesis, ga 
marks the patient/theme in the judō sentences. By contrast, the patient/
theme in the ukemi sentences is marked by o as in the neutral diathe-
sis. As for ni, it marks the recipient in the neutral diathesis (7b), but the 
agent in the judō and ukemi sentences. (To complicate matters, ni can also 
mark the recipient in judō sentences with particular verbs, as in hon ga/
wa marii ni atae-rare-ta ‘the book was given to Mary,’ but because this con-
struction has no bearing on the present analysis, I will not further discuss 
it here.)
A major semantic difference between judō and ukemi lies in the different 
ways the entities involved in the event structure expressed in the two construc-
tions are profiled. From a procedural perspective, the profiling in judō (7d) is 
comparable to that of the English sentence, doa ‘door’ being the “promoted” 
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ACTA linguiSTiCA HAfniEnSiA  17
participant and kodomo ‘child’ the “demoted” one.6 By contrast, the ukemi 
examples (7f–h) express reference to an affected person (ji) who is contrasted to 
any non-affected person (or ta) (Kishitani 1985, 78, 223; Coseriu [1979] 1987, 
105). The affected ji – Hanako in (7h), a not explicitly mentioned person in (7f) 
and (7g) – is the “recipient” of what the verb or the rest of the clause designates 
(note that “recipient” is the original etymological meaning of ukemi, Kishitani 
1985, 210). The affectedness relationship is usually identified as “adversity” in 
the literature (Kuno 1973, 24; Wierzbicka 1988, 261; Shibatani 1994, 464; Toyota 
2011, 15, 34; Iwasaki 2013, 160), thus classifying ukemi along the lines of the 
well-known “adversative passive” construction which is considered typical of a 
number of Southeast Asian languages (Malchukov 1993; Prasithrathsint 2004). 
However, the affectedness can also be positive in the Japanese ukemi construc-
tion, depending on the semantics of the verb (Kishitani 1985, 213; Wierzbicka 
1988, 268–270; Iwasaki 2013, 161). Given that adversity is the dominant reading 
in Japanese, it qualifies as a strong tendency in “normal language use” in the 
terminology of Coseriu ([1952] 1975), hence as a preferred “sense” (a GCI) 
rather than a “signifié” of the construction (cf. Section 4). The same holds for 
the typical “honorific” use of -(r)are-forms (cf. Kishitani 1985, 251, 272 and 
Iwasaki 2013, 321).7
Still from a procedural perspective, judō largely corresponds to the famil-
iar picture of the European passive as a valency decreasing construction in 
which, e.g., the promoted doa ‘door’ in (7d–e) is most affected. In ukemi, the 
affectedness relationship is of a different nature: the construction can host an 
additional constituent designating the affected person ji. Shibatani (1994, 468) 
correctly qualifies this constituent as an “extra-thematic nominal” rather than 
in terms of a valency increasing construction (pace Iwasaki 2013, 158). It is 
often marked by the postposition wa, but ga is also possible, cf. (7h) (Kishitani 
1985, 189; Toyota 2011, 12).
Whereas ukemi nowadays is simply qualified as a kind of passive (viz. “indi-
rect passive”), Kishitani (1985, 186–187) doubts the possibility of defining a 
crosslinguistic concept that is able to accommodate both passive and ukemi, 
thus favoring a strict particularist viewpoint. Coseriu ([1979] 1987, 108–109) 
believes that a synthesis of both views is desirable. The Japanese ukemi and 
the passive typical of European languages are comparable and to some degree 
6contrary to standard practice (e.g. toyota 2011; iwasaki 2013), i adopt this procedural perspective, which 
is still very common in the literature on diathesis in general, for expository purposes only, without imply-
ing that the judō and ukemi sentences are in any real sense “transformations” or “conversions” of a basic 
active sentence. i consider diatheses (sensu latiore, including active, passive, middle, judō, ukemi, causative, 
benefactive, applicative, antipassive, inverse, non-actor focus etc., cf. Kulikov 2011; siewierska 2013) to be 
constructions in their own right, in line with the constructional view of grammar and linguistic knowledge. 
As coseriu (1987) recognized, the procedural perspective is a metalinguistic one, which means that “promote” 
and “demote” are in the first place explanatory devices (even though they can refer to real processes even 
in “ordinary” language under certain circumstances).
7shibatani (1994) is an illuminating analysis of adversity against the backdrop of crossconstructional simi-
larities in several languages. for an altogether different analysis of ukemi in terms of a multiple polysemous 
construction, s. Wierzbicka (1988); compare also toyota (2011).
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18  K. WillEmS
similar insofar as the constructions partly overlap in their uses, even though 
their language-specific meanings are very different. In the terminology of Table 
1: in the English passive, either the affectedness of the “promoted” direct object 
or of the “promoted” indirect object (as in the English indirect passive, Mary 
was given the book) is coded as idiomatic knowledge. By contrast, ukemi invar-
iably encodes the affectedness of ji, who can be left unexpressed. The judō con-
struction, on the other hand, is more similar to the European passive. In either 
case, to the extent that the linguistic encoding is different, the functions of the 
constructions are commensurable in discourse and texts, as devices of designa-
tion, i.e. at the level of expressive knowledge and elocutional knowledge, even 
though they are not at the level of idiomatic knowledge (Coseriu 1977, 118).
This analysis requires that similarities and differences between constructions 
in different languages are described as detailed as possible under a unifying 
heading (cf. Matthews 1997 and Haspelmath 2010, 681 for discussion; cf. also 
Haspelmath 2004). This may to some degree constitute a metalinguistic chal-
lenge. According to Coseriu (1987, 111–112), the ukemi construction encodes a 
relationship from the point of view of the event structure designated by the verb. 
Conversely, constructions such as the English and German passives encode a 
relationship from the point of view of the participant(s) involved in the verb’s 
event structure. Whether such relatively simple contrastive characterizations 
are precise enough is a matter of debate and cannot be discussed here. However, 
it is important to stress that from a Coserian perspective one needs to pay 
attention to the isomorphism of the constructions discussed in this section 
across languages. What they share is that they code the profiling of an event, 
a state or an action with regard to one or more participants. Hence, despite 
the differences that emerge from language comparison, it is not an arbitrary 
choice to subsume the constructions under the heading “diathesis” in a general 
sense.8 Crucially, this entails that diathesis is not only a comparative concept, 
nor a purely terminological semantic label, but a full-fledged category of lan-
guage whose semantic and morphosyntactic definition can be provided on a 
more abstract level than that of language-specific form/meaning pairings. It is 
here that the relevance of possible universals becomes particularly apparent: 
it is possible that different form/meaning pairings such as passive and ukemi, 
which are to be situated at the idiomatic levels of different languages, share 
basic common properties even though they are language-particular. On this 
view, diathesis and its instantiations in different languages are to be considered 
possible universals, categories of language being both language-particular and 
potentially universal.
8this might partly explain why Japanese speakers had apparently no problems integrating the originally 
un-Japanese “direct passive” typical of european languages such as english and Dutch into their diathesis 
system, apparently as an extension of the original ukemi (cf. coseriu 1987, 112, 118 and Kishitani 1985, 230, 
pace shibatani 1985, 842, who analyzes the “indirect passive” as an extension of the “direct passive”). cf. also 
Kinsui (1997, 773) who makes a similar remark concerning the introduction of niyotte as a variant of ni in 
Japanese as a result of language contact with Dutch.
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ACTA linguiSTiCA HAfniEnSiA  19
6. Concluding remarks
This article has discussed how Eugenio Coseriu’s model of linguistic analysis 
can be brought to bear on identifying the levels of meaning at which languages 
are assumed to be comparable and on clarifying the relationship between lan-
guage-particular categories and crosslinguistic concepts. It has been shown, 
first, that the outcome of crosslinguistic comparison depends on the level of 
meaning one is concerned with. Whereas “elocutional knowledge” is univer-
sal insofar as extralinguistic knowledge and general principles of thought are 
not language-specific, “expressive knowledge” is universal in a different sense: 
the content created in acts of discourse and texts is the object of interlingual 
translation. Conversely, “idiomatic knowledge” can only be potentially uni-
versal, to the extent that certain more or less strong tendencies are observed 
in particular areas of language-specific meanings, e.g. the converging ways in 
which possession is coded in different languages with regard to alienable and 
inalienable relations and the various ways diathesis is realized across languages.
Second, from a Coserian point of view the realm of universals is not exhausted 
by empirical and essential universals. Attention has to be paid to yet another 
type of universal: possible universals. Its main theoretical contribution is that 
this type of universal is helpful in understanding the relationship between lan-
guage-particular categories and crosslinguistic concepts. Functional typologists 
rightly point out that the two questions “What are the grammatical relations and 
categories in a particular language?” and “What should we call them?” should 
not be confused (Dryer 1997, 124). However, this does not mean that only the 
first question is a substantive one and the second merely a matter of convenient 
labeling. Nor does it mean that language-particular categories and crosslin-
guistic concepts are independent of one another. The case study on diathesis 
in Section 5 has shown that there is a substantial difference between engaging 
in a “category-assignment controversy” (Dryer 1997, 1998; Haspelmath 2007, 
2010) and applying a crosslinguistic concept for analytical purposes to a specific 
phenomenon encountered in one or more languages. In category-assignment 
controversies, the question is whether some observed phenomenon (a form/
meaning pairing) is, e.g. a ‘subject’ or an ‘object,’ a ‘verb,’ ‘adjective’ or ‘noun,’ a 
‘case marker’ etc. (Haspelmath 2007, 124). Such controversies are pointless to 
the extent that “no universally applicable necessary and sufficient criteria for 
defining a priori categories can be given” (2007, 125). Yet there are necessary 
and sufficient criteria for defining a language-particular category so that it 
can be consistently applied to that particular language, even though it is not 
universally applicable (cf. Dryer 1997, 132–135 who convincingly argues that 
grammatical categories cannot be coherently defined as crosslinguistic proto-
types; for different views, see Shibatani 1985 and Comrie 1988, among others). 
If a category is viewed as a possible universal, using crosslinguistic concepts in 
the analysis of languages which do not possess the category does not necessarily 
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amount to fitting different phenomena into some preestablished mold of some 
popular category (Haspelmath 2007, 119). For example, although the European 
conception of passive obviously cannot accommodate the ukemi in Japanese 
(and many other diatheses in other languages), drawing on the concept of 
passive does not constitute an arbitrary choice in the crosslinguistic compar-
ison. “Passive” is a possible universal that can be subsumed under the general 
concept of “diathesis” which is also a possible universal. “Diathesis,” in turn, 
covers a wide range of constructions which share the property that they profile 
participants (regardless whether they are expressed or not) that are involved 
in the state, event or action designated by the verb. To be sure, diathesis is not 
rationally necessary, hence not an essential universal (nor a “Platonic concept,” 
Dryer 1997, 133). Yet, many languages appear to have some kind of diathesis, 
i.e. at least two constructions between which speakers can choose in order to 
profile a state of affairs (and a particular language may have a number of such 
diatheses). Even if a language does not show any evidence of diathesis, it still 
counts as a possible universal.
Whereas category-assignment controversies wrongly assume that a single 
category exists in different languages in spite of substantial semantic and for-
mal differences, drawing on the concept of possible universals has – even if 
unwittingly – an altogether different, “hermeneutic” purpose (cf. Coseriu 2000, 
110). It contributes to fleshing out the idea, or perhaps the intuition, that there 
is “unity in diversity” in human languages. From a Coserian perspective, this 
entails that analyzing phenomena in lesser known languages in terms of con-
cepts derived from well-studied languages – the common fallacy in typology, 
according to categorial particularism – is only one source of knowledge, albeit 
one that is prone to error if it is tapped for the wrong reasons. The other source 
is not language-specific: each fact found in a language, even if encountered in 
only one language for the time being, is a conceptual possibility of what H. 
Steinthal, drawing on W. von Humboldt, called the “idea of language” (Coseriu 
1977, 325, 344), i.e. the dynamic, productive ability to produce and comprehend 
language which all human beings share. This brings us back to the model of 
linguistic competence presented in Table 1: the “idea of language” is the abil-
ity which enables speakers not simply to reproduce language as a historically 
inherited system (Ergon) but to create language anew (Energeia) on the basis 
of linguistic knowledge (Dynamis) gained while acquiring and using language.
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